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The use of Cohort Default Rate (CDR) as the primary measure of
student loan defaults among undergraduates was investigated.
The study used data extracted from the National Student Loan
Data System (NSLDS), quantitative analysis of Likert-scale sur-
vey responses from 153 student financial aid professionals on
proposed changes to present metrics and methods, and anony-
mous, qualitative interviews with 12 notable scholars and ex-
perts about default aversion strategies. A sample of defaults over
eight years revealed a default rate of 17.91%, or almost double
the published two-year CDR of 9.6% for the 1996 cohort. Further,
the actual average default rate for the entire student loan  portfo-
lio was found to be 13.65%, or 2.44 times higher than a point-in-
time CDR of 5.6% as of September 30, 2002, suggesting limita-
tions of the CDR as the sole loan  portfolio measurement tool.
Additionally, there is dissatisfaction with the present 25% de-
fault rate ceiling required for schools to maintain institutional eli-
gibility to participate in the Title IV federal student aid programs.
Entire school groups exceeded the 25% default ceiling when
viewed over eight years. The study also found strong support for
greater utilization of loan guaranty agencies in default aversion
instead of debt collection.
The study concludes that economic and demographic
changes taking place in higher education over the period 2001-
2015 necessitate increased funding for outreach programs to
educate low-income and minority at-risk populations on the avail-
ability of federal student aid, student loan repayment options,
and the consequences of default. Other recommendations of the
scholars and experts interviewed for this study include re-engi-
neering default management and school performance measures,
forming a national task force focused on finding affordable higher
education approaches for the at-risk groups, and initiating a study
of expanded debt forgiveness for critical occupations such as
teaching, health care, and civil protection.
A
s of September 30, 2003, there were 5,582,494 Ameri-
cans in default (NSLDS, 2003) and many more are carry-
ing very large student loan debt burdens that might con-
tribute to the risk level of the federal student loan portfolio. The
growing burden of student borrowing calls into question the
personal benefits model that assumes that Americans will con-
tinue to borrow to finance their postsecondary education as an
investment in their future. David Ward, president of the Ameri-
can Council on Education, expressed concern about the finan-
cial health of academe when commenting on tuition increases.
Frank Kesterman is a
consultant in the Washington
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for the Department of
Education in the office of
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There are “very serious long-term issues in financing higher
education that ultimately threaten the social compact that has
served students and families so well for more than 50 years”
(Hoover, 2004, p.1).
Debt burdens need to be better understood in human
and statistical terms in order to devise default aversion options
that work (Kesterman, 2003). A recent report titled “Burden of
Borrowing,” published by the Higher Education Project of the
State Public Interest Group in 2002 and based on the U.S. De-
partment of Education’s 2000 National Post Secondary Student
Aid Study, found that an estimated 39% of student borrowers
are graduating with “unmanageable debt,” which is defined as
debt in excess of 8% of borrowers’ gross monthly income. In
addition, 55% of African-American student borrowers and 58%
of Hispanic student borrowers graduated with unmanageable
debt burdens (King & Bannon, 2002).
Attitudes toward borrowing appear to be changing. In
the 2002 National Student Loan Survey sponsored by Nellie Mae,
only 59% of students agreed that the benefits of incurring stu-
dent loans are worth it. Another 20% were neutral (Baum &
O’Malley, 2003). Compared with other surveys, this was the low-
est percentage to agree that the benefits of student loans are
worth the debt burden. The earlier percentages of students who
gave this response were 66% in 1997, 74% in 1991, and 68% in
1988 (Baum & O’Malley, 2003). These statistics suggest that
the limits of the personal-benefit model are being tested. When
predicting the future health of higher education, those in aca-
deme should monitor carefully shifts in the assumption that
the benefits of higher education still exceed the costs of student
loan borrowing. To place the importance of this topic in per-
spective, Fossey and Bateman state: “It can be argued that ap-
preciably higher student loan levels represent almost as signifi-
cant a development in federal aid policy as the GI Bill or the
original Higher Education Act of 1965” (Bateman, & Fossey,
1998, p. 71).
To help advance the understanding of debt burdens and
effective default aversion strategies, study examines the use of
the Cohort Default Rate (CDR) as the principal metric for as-
sessing student loan defaults in a time of increased borrowing
to meet escalation in the cost of postsecondary education. A
major inspiration for this research was the Student Loan Re-
payment Symposium, held in October 2000. This study builds
on the recommendations of that symposium (Woods, 2001).
By analyzing NSLDS data queries, this study established trends
in student borrowing and defaults (NSLDS, 2003). NSLDS, op-
erated by contractors for the U.S. Department of Education (ED),
is the central data system that tracks all federal student loans
and Federal Pell Grants. As of October 2, 2003, NSLDS contained
records on 165,197,525 loans held by 50,131,888 borrowers.
Archival Data
Analysis
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Records cover borrowers who are in grace period, repayment,
deferment, forbearance, or default. Student borrower records
are maintained in NSLDS for up to 30 years, until the loans are
paid in full, or until the debt obligation has been relieved through
death, permanent disability, or personal bankruptcy.
Access to NSLDS records to support this research was
obtained under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (NSLDS,
2003). Specifically, defaults for the 1996 sample cohort of
2,197,188 borrowers were tracked for eight years, from 1996
through 2003, and compared with aggregate national cohort
default rates published by ED for the same 1996 cohort. Using
the FOIA sample, student loan defaults of the 1996 sample co-
hort over eight years were found to be 17.91%, compared to the
two-year CDR of 9.6% published by ED for the 1996 cohort.
The understatement of the loan default problem by us-
ing the CDR is also supported by data from the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB). OMB uses credit-subsidy models
for making estimates of subsidies for all government loan pro-
grams, as required under the Credit Reform Act of 1990. By law,
the budget for ED and the Budget of the United States provide
estimates of loan lifetime default rates and subsidy expense by
school type, grouped by risk categories. Student loan default
rates from the 2004 Budget of the United States (Budget, 2004)
were used as a benchmark and found to be consistent with





Student Loan Dollar Amount of
Principal and Loan Balances Percentage Number of Percentage of
Interest Outstanding, in Default, of Amount Borrowers Borrowers
in Billions in Billions in Default in Default in Default
4th 1999 230.5 28.9 12.55 6,189,990 17.11
1st 2000 237.7 29.0 12.18 6,206,012 17.01
2nd 2000 242.6 28.4 11.72 6,259,922 17.06
3rd 2000 250.9 28.6 11.38 6,262,103 16.70
4th 2000 253.0 27.8 11.00 6,251,157 16.52
1st 2001 261.0 29.4 11.26 5,781,083 15.16
2nd 2001 263.8 28.6 10.85 5,383,861 14.03
3rd 2001 275.5 29.7 10.79 5,821,160 14.81
4th 2001 279.4 29.9 10.71 5,829,309 14.67
1st 2002 289.3 30.8 10.65 5,752,323 14.35
2nd 2002 292.9 30.9 10.56 5,587,553 14.30
3rd 2002 302.8 31.5 10.40 5,616,463 13.65
4th 2002 309.6 32.1 10.36 6,118,409 13.27
1st 2003 321.4 32.2 10.03 5,601,388 13.22
2nd 2003 328.3 32.8 9.99 5,574,920 13.02
3rd 2003 335.6 32.7 9.78 5,582,494 12.81
Source: NSLDS, 2003.
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Table 1 presents statistics from the NSLDS showing ac-
tual data trends.
These NSLDS data (NSLDS, 2003) represent the loan
portfolio as a whole, indicating a favorable trend: the percent-
age of students in default over time has been declining from
17% to 12.8%. In contrast, the CDR, which is also declining
over time, is based on borrowers who entered repayment and
defaulted in that year or the following year. To illustrate the
relevancy of the CDR as an indicator, the FY 2002 CDR, which
corresponds to the third calendar quarter of 2002 (the period
ending September 30, 2002), was 5.6%. At that time the per-
centage of students in default for the entire portfolio was 13.65%,
or 2.44 times higher than the CDR on that date. Hence, the
limitations of the CDR  as a measurement tool should be un-
derstood in the proper context as a short-term trend indicator.
Data collection began with a Likert-scale survey questionnaire
sent to the members of the National Association of State Stu-
dent Grant and Aid Programs (NASSGAP), and the National
Council of Higher Education Loan Programs (NCHELP). The com-
bined importance of these two organizations as sources of ex-
pertise provides significant credibility to the survey results.
NASSGAP has published its annual survey of state-sponsored
student financial aid programs for 36 years. Its members are
the higher education officers drawn from single agencies in each
state and territory of the United States responsible for state-
funded student aid. NCHELP represents hundreds of lenders,
guaranty agencies, schools, loan servicers, collectors and sec-
ondary markets involved in the administration of the Federal
Family Education Loan Program (FFELP).
NCHELP’s Debt Management Committee and Financial
Aid Professionals Committee collaborate with the NASSGAP
Research Committee and collectively with the NASSGAP/
NCHELP Research Network. The NASSGAP/NCHELP Research
Network has deliberated for 21 years on common student fi-
nancial aid policy issues such as access, affordability, and per-
sistence, all of which involve federal and state financial aid pro-
grams. The NASSGAP/NCHELP research population of 270 prac-
titioner experts constitutes a diverse group of researchers with-
out a common political agenda and thus is an ideal population
for a quantitative survey on student financial aid.
Responding to a formal request to use the organization’s
mailing list, NASSGAP/NCHELP Research Network Chairman
Jerry Sheehan Davis, former vice president for research at the
Lumina Foundation, stated:
Over the 21 years of meetings, the network grew to in-
clude college faculty members, Washington education
association representatives, staff from state and regional
Quantitative
Research
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education associations, Department of Education staff,
an occasional legislator, loan service bureau employees
and consultants. It is a very diverse group, held together
by their common interest in sharing knowledge on stu-
dent financial aid and access related issues. Each of the
conferences has featured presentations on loan issues.
Almost all of the events have had at least one presenta-
tion on student loan default issues. For all these rea-
sons, I was confident that the network mailing list would
include everyone in the nation who had any level of ex-
pertise in your dissertation topic (J.S. Davis, personal e-
mail communication, December 10, 2004).
This core population of 270 people was expanded through
the cooperation of the separate NCHELP Debt Committee to cre-
ate a total sample population of 431. The NCHELP Debt Man-
agement Committee is comprised of officials and executives of
the student loan guarantee agencies, state student financial aid
assistance commissions, FFEL lenders, debt collection agen-
cies, and FFEL student loan servicing companies. The chair of
the NCHELP Debt Management Committee endorsed the survey
questions and sent the survey directly to the members of the
committee, recommending voluntary participation. Other
NCHELP members were randomly selected based on their job
titles having management responsibilities for default aversion.
Others not associated with the NASSGAP/NCHELP Re-
search Network also participated. These included representa-
tives of student financial aid associations and present and former
officials of the U.S. Department of Education with student fi-
nancial aid experience up through the rank of Assistant Secre-
tary of Education. Roughly 35% of these individuals (153) re-
sponded to the survey, which was conducted by e-mail. The
survey provided statements to which the respondents indicated
their level of agreement: strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree,
or strongly disagree. The questions were developed after a round
of discussions with a focus group of leaders in the financial aid
field, and were field tested on a group of 21 financial aid profes-
sionals. The field test successfully achieved a Cronbach’s alpha
reliability factor of 0.728 (UCLA, 2004).
An explanatory mixed-method approach was used to capture
the best of the quantitative and qualitative research designs.
The quantitative data was collected first. The qualitative data
was then collected and used to help explain or elaborate on the
quantitative results. Qualitative data was used to refine the
quantitative results by exploring a few issues in-depth, probing
key findings and seeking an explanation for the lack of consen-
sus on a certain policy question.
For the qualitative part of the analysis, 12 notable ex-
perts and scholars were interviewed. Each of these individuals
met the following criteria:
Qualitative
Research
79777_Text.P65 4/11/06, 5:20 PM38
39NASFAA JOURNAL OF STUDENT FINANCIAL AID
• Holds or has held high positions in the field of student fi-
nancial aid policy;
• Has published a number of authoritative reports and is a
recognized authority in student aid literature; and
• Has worked for ten or more years in the field of student
financial aid policy, teaching, research, student aid infra-
structure industries, or government.
The notable experts and scholars selected and inter-
viewed included a president of a student financial aid associa-
tion; an independent financial aid witness for congressional com-
mittees; a leading default aversion executive at a state guaranty
agency; a director of student financial aid at a large private uni-
versity; a director of research at a financial aid industry asso-
ciation; a member of the Student Financial Aid Advisory Com-
mission; a recognized federal student financial aid official; a
representative of the FFEL lending community; a representa-
tive of the career college community; a representative of the state
and community college system; a government relations execu-
tive for a large student loan lender/service organization; and  a
senior executive with a student loan collection agency.
Interviewees were asked open-ended survey questions
relating to the Likert-scale issues to elicit their views on the
history leading up to the current policy and their thinking on
the refinement of policy improvements suggested by the quanti-
tative survey. The interview elicited recommendations for legal,
regulatory, and management changes that appear to offer new
solutions or improvements in practices and policies. The Likert-
scale survey findings and the in-depth interviews provide the
basis for recommendations on student loan borrowing, debt
burdens, and default issues.
The official FY 1996 CDR was 9.6% for 2,423,286 students who
were in repayment and who defaulted in that year or the follow-
ing year. After eliminating foreign schools and small programs
such as one-year proprietary schools, a sample cohort of
2,197,188 FFEL, Federal Direct (FDLP), and Federal Perkins Loan
borrowers was used for analysis (NSLDS, 2003). The FY1996
CDR for the 2,197,188 borrowers in the sample was 8.06%,
which is actually lower than the published 9.6% CDR. Table 2
shows that 393,623 borrowers defaulted through FY 2003, or
17.91% of the 2,197,188 borrowers in the cohort. The greatest
number of defaults occurred in the second, third, and fourth
year after entering repayment.
A review of the data indicates that the longer the default
rate measurement period in the life of loans, the higher the de-
fault rate for the overall cohort. In this sample, the number of
borrowers who actually defaulted by the end of the eighth year
was 17.91, or more than double the 8.06% cohort default rate
calculated for the first two years of repayment.
The FY 1996
NSLDS Cohort
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The sample also indicates that the second, third, and
fourth years of repayment constitute a high-risk period over the
life of loan. Clearly, the second year is the peak in the risk pro-
file. This finding also supports the use of the CDR as a useful
short-term risk indicator that would be even more useful if it
were extended to four years, as recommended by the qualitative
survey results. The risk relationship over time holds true for
individual school types. As shown in Table 3, several categories
of schools exceeded the 25% ceiling in the 8-year view.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show that default curves are steep-
est in the first 4 years, with the second year being the peak for
defaults. By the fifth year, proprietary associate’s degree, pro-
prietary post- graduate, proprietary bachelor’s degree, and public
associate’s degree have crossed the 25% default line as a cat-
egory of schools. Default rates are much higher for two-year
schools than for four-year schools.
The 153 respondents to the Likert-scale survey questions rep-
resent virtually every constituency with an interest in the fu-
ture of student financial aid. Responses were received from uni-
versity and college student aid administrators; professors; deans
of schools; presidents and executives of educational associa-
tions; student consumer groups; career schools; lenders; rating
agencies; state guaranty agencies; default aversion specialists;
debt collection specialists; noted authors and consultants; ad-
visory commission members; and government student aid
officials up through the rank of Assistant Secretary of Educa-
tion.
A summary of the distribution of responses to the sur-
vey is shown in the Appendix.
Table 2
Cohort FY 1996 Defaults, by Fiscal Year










Total number of borrowers
in the FY96 cohort 2,197,188
Percentage of
borrowers in the FY96
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Statement 1: The individual Institutional Cohort Default Rate and
the aggregate federal loan portfolio default rate would be more
valuable as performance measures if extended over a longer time
period in phases beginning with an initial 4-year measurement
period from the time of entering repayment.
The survey found that 81.7% of the respondents strongly
agree or agree with Statement 1. About 13.1% of the respon-
dents strongly disagree or disagree with this proposal, and the
remainder (5.2%) was neutral.
This overwhelming support for longer timeframes for
observing defaults confirms earlier reports on this issue. At the
Student Loan Repayment Symposium (hereafter, the Sympo-
sium) held in October 2000, financial aid professionals concluded
that the 2-year cohort default rate window was not representa-
tive of actual default experience over longer periods. They re-
ported, “Rates are roughly double the 2-year cohort rate” (Woods,
2001, p. 8). There was also support at the Symposium for mea-
suring the life of loan default rates.
The question of lifetime default rates raises the issue of
how long schools should be held accountable for students who
default after graduating or leaving school. One expert interviewed
at an education association put forward the notion of extended
institutional responsibility for student loan repayment:
Number of
Number of FFEL and Number of
Students in Federal Perkins FDLP Total
School Type Program Length Repayment Loan Defaults Defaults Defaults Rate
Public Associate’s degree   261,817    69,392   4,602   73,994 28.26%
Public Bachelor’s degree    37,525     6,408     984    7,392 19.70%
Public Post-graduate   950,690   112,144   28,506  140,650 14.79%
Private/non-profit Associate’s degree    18,543     4,386      98    4,484 24.18%
Private/non-profit Bachelor’s degree   122,221    19,187   2,604   21,791 17.83%
Private/non-profit Post-graduate   570,254    58,429   8,048   66,477 11.66%
Proprietary Associate’s degree   134,927    36,018   4,846   40,864 30.29%
Proprietary Bachelor’s degree    76,292    18,240   4,226   22,466 29.45%
Proprietary Post-graduate    24,919     5,221     500    5,721 22.96%
All Types  2,197,188   329,425   54,414  383,839 17.47%
Source: NSLDS, 2003.
Note: Total defaults reported in Table 3 above is lower than total defaults in Table 2 because Table 3 uses seven
years of data thru FY 2002, whereas Table 3 uses eight years of data thru FY 2003.
Table 3
Students Entering Repayment During the 1996 Cohort Year
and Entering Default During 1996 or Subsequent Years,
Through FY 2002
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In repayment, because schools benefit from the tuition
paid from the student loan asset, they have implied li-
ability to make sure the student can repay loans through
successful education leading to employment. Of course
this is difficult to enforce on the school or the lender if
the default occurs after several schools and/or several
career changes.
The period that schools may have implied liability for
student loan defaults is debatable. Currently, ED holds schools
accountable for student loan defaults after the students leave
school, and this is not likely to change because the schools have
been very responsible in helping students understand their re-
sponsibilities as borrowers. Lenders are not held accountable
to ED to the same standard as schools because the offering of
federal student loans is a federal entitlement.
Statement 2:  From a risk management perspective, and the per-
spective of taxpayers, dollars in default is highly relevant to moni-
toring dollar losses associated with loan programs. In addition to
the Cohort Default Rate measure, dollar balances in default should
be tracked by the Department of Education as a second default
measure.
More than 80% of the respondents strongly agreed or
agreed with Statement 2. This approach is consistent with a rec-



































ED cohort default rate
Figure 1
Incremental Increase in Default Percentage Rate Over Time for Students
with Repayment Data Within FY 1996 who Enter Default in that Year
or in Later Years, Through FY 2001, by Program Type
Source: NSLDS, 2003
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Dollars in default is a clear performance measure that
we can use to determine how well we are doing. All
schools, lenders, servicers, debt collectors and the De-
partment of Education can work together to reduce dol-
lars in default…. This would mean that resources cur-
rently needed to comply with the strict regulatory re-
quirements could be redirected or targeted to those bor-
rowers who need the most support. In other words, let’s
focus our efforts where they will be most effective in pre-
venting defaults (Woods, 2001, p. 8).
Statement 3: The one-size-fits-all ceiling of 25% is out-of-date as
the lone measure for excessive cohort default rates subject to
sanctions or loss of Title IV eligibility. The single ceiling should be
replaced with peer group benchmarks, some with higher or lower
ceilings set according to peer group experience, i.e., four-year col-
leges, two-year colleges and proprietary schools.
Of the respondents. 61.5% agreed or strongly agreed with
Statement 3. However, 26.8% disagreed or strongly disagreed
with this proposal. This suggests dissatisfaction with the status
quo but a lack of consensus as to the remedy. One reason for
disagreement with this proposal was expressed by a noted mem-
ber of the Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance:
I think it is very difficult to establish peer schools. Not












































Students With Repayment Data Within FY 1996 Who Enter Default
in That Year or in Later Years, by Fiscal Year
Source: NSLDS, 2003.
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a thousand community colleges are lumped together in
most discussions. Further, many proprietary schools are
now degree-granting and regionally accredited, and
should not be submerged into a peer category of propri-
etary schools that is made up mostly of short-term oc-
cupational certificate-granting programs. Also, is it ap-
propriate to put for-profit schools together with not-for-
profit schools as peers?
Several experts expressed the opinion that the CDR ceil-
ing was artificial when it was imposed 10 years ago and is even
more artificial today. However, there is something to be said for
keeping it, because people in the student aid field understand
it. Some penalty ceiling is needed to keep pressure on the schools
to improve default aversion practices, particularly at some pro-
prietary schools and Historical Black Colleges and Universities
still having problems with high default rates.
Statement 4: Guaranty agencies and the Department of Educa-
tion should negotiate a common compensation formula with sub-
stantial incentives for curing delinquencies and preventing de-
faults.
More than 78% strongly agreed or agreed to Statement
4, versus 9.8% who strongly disagreed or disagreed, and 11.8%
remained neutral.
Guaranty agencies are currently compensated for 23%
of the money they collect from borrowers whose loans are in
default (270-days delinquent). If a defaulted loan is converted to
a FFELP or FDLP Consolidation loan, the guaranty agency re-
tains 18.5%. These fees of 23% and 18.5% are added as a sur-
charge to the outstanding student loan balance. This surcharge
does not help indebted students get out of debt. According to
some guaranty agency officials, this percentage is typically higher
than a guaranty agency’s actual cost of collecting on defaulted
loans. As a result, guaranty agencies have more financial in-
centive to allow borrowers to default than to prevent the default
(GAO, 2002). In 1998, Congress enacted Voluntary Flexible
Agreements (VFA) legislation as part of the Higher Education
Act amendments, to encourage ED to develop better compensa-
tion schemes with the guaranty agencies (GAO, 2002).
One interviewed expert from an education association
believes that the guaranty agencies not only have misaligned
incentives, they also add to the data integrity problem as a re-
sult of all the additional handling of funds and reporting they
are required to perform as an intermediary between the lend-
ers, students, schools and the Department of Education.
Statement 5: The federal government, state governments, schools,
and lenders should increase funding for outreach programs to







years ago and is
even more artificial
today.
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help reduce the probability of default by educating students and
their parents on the importance of completing their education, their
responsibilities as borrowers, and the consequences of defaults.
The survey results for Statement 5 indicate almost uni-
versal awareness that changing national and regional demo-
graphics are expected to increase the number of high-risk stu-
dents seeking higher education in the next 10 years and be-
yond. By the year 2013-2014, the number of Hispanic high school
graduates is expected to increase by 80%, Asians 44%, Ameri-
can Indians 16%, and African Americans 6%, while the number
of Caucasians graduating from public high schools is expected
to decline by 11% (WICHE, 2003). Historically, default risk is
higher for racial/ethnic minority students and for those in pro-
prietary schools and community colleges. This difference is ex-
pected to increase in the next ten years as more students with
lower family incomes seek the job skills and upward economic
mobility that postsecondary education can offer. Many families
in high-risk populations have no experience with higher educa-
tion; this is the scenario for higher default risk in the years
ahead.
Accordingly, 72.6% of the respondents strongly agreed
or agreed with the sentiment that the default chances for high-
risk populations can be improved through effective outreach
education programs, whereas only 11.2% strongly disagreed or
disagreed, and 16.3% were neutral. The twelve scholars and
experts interviewed were in general agreement that the federal
government, state governments, schools, lenders, and private
foundations all have roles to play in increasing funding for out-
reach programs to help increase completion rates and reduce
the probability of default. They recommend early and continu-
ous education of students, as well as their parents, on the im-
portance of completing their education, their responsibilities as
borrowers, and the serious consequences of default.
On a macro-economic level, former Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan created a sense of national urgency
with respect to this issue in his testimony before the House
Financial Services Committee:
The growing pay gap reflects the “skill premium” com-
manded by relatively higher educated, better trained
workers, and represents a major problem of matching
skills of workers to the technological base of the economy,
which I believe is an education issue and requires that
we address that as quickly and as broadly as we can.”
Further, he called for “improvements in education and
training for school-age children and for adults through-
out their working lives” (Greenspan, 2004).
The results of the Likert-scale survey, the in-depth interviews with
12 scholars and experts, and the analysis of extensive archival
Conclusions
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data obtained from ED show that the present default measure-
ment metric systems—the CDR calculations—need to be
reengineered to provide a more comprehensive assessment of
student loan default trends. This study shows that when viewed
over eight years, the actual default rate is approximately double
the published FY1996 CDR and entire school groups exceed the
25% default rate ceiling. Additionally, over 80% of the survey
responses support the development of improved systems that
more accurately measure both students and dollars in default.
While there is widespread agreement among survey re-
spondents that the default measures should be changed, they
offered only modest support for using peer group ceilings—i.e.,
four-year colleges, two-year colleges, and proprietary schools—
to replace the current single three-year CDR ceiling of 25% for
imposing sanctions or loss of Title IV student aid eligibility. Sev-
eral experts expressed the opinion that the CDR ceiling was
artificial when it was imposed 10 years ago and is even more
artificial today. However an argument can be made for keeping
it: people in the business are familiar with it. Some penalty ceil-
ing is needed to keep pressure on the schools to improve default
rates.
The survey results represent a definite mandate about
the default aversion productivity of guaranty agencies that are
an integral part of the FFEL loan program and funded with fed-
eral resources. More than three-quarters of respondents strongly
agreed or agreed with the proposition that guaranty agencies
and ED should negotiate a common compensation formula with
substantial incentives for curing delinquencies and preventing
defaults. Only 9.8% strongly disagreed or disagreed while 11.8%
remained neutral.
The results also demonstrate a growing consensus that
more resources need to be acquired and applied in innovative
ways to promote default aversion strategies to high-risk minor-
ity and low-income populations. Nearly 73% of respondents
highly agreed or agreed with this proposition. These results re-
flect the shifting demographics in the United States and its
monumental importance to the country’s future, as a growing
number of new college students will be low-income and from
racial and ethnic minority families—groups traditionally at a
higher risk for defaulting on student loans. Accordingly, there
was near universal agreement among survey participants that
the federal and state governments, schools, and lenders should
increase funding for outreach programs to educate high-risk
populations on the availability of federal student loans, repay-
ment options, and the consequences of defaults. Such policies
will improve default aversion and risk management by reducing
the probability of defaults occurring.
There was also a general consensus among those inter-
viewed that the government, schools, lenders, and founda-
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education to students and their parents about the importance
of completing education and the serious consequences of de-
fault—on the student’s quality of life as well as the economic
strength of the country. However, who should perform what roles
is less clear.
The study results suggest a number of recommendations to
improve both the reporting of default rates and the information
to students, families, and borrowers about these defaults. Taken
together, these recommendations are designed ultimately to re-
duce the rate of defaults and to lower the costs of the program
to the taxpayers.
1. Correct the two-year CDR formula by moving to a tracking pe-
riod of four years or longer, and tracking dollar balances in de-
fault as a second default measure.
Student loans in deferment or forbearance should be removed
from both the numerator (defaults) and the denominator (stu-
dents in repayment) to avoid understatement of the CDR. This
endorses the recommendation of the Office of Inspector General
(OIG) that the Department of Education should ask Congress to
exclude from the default-rate calculations “Borrowers who are
not subject to a risk of default during the 2-year cohort period
because their loans are in deferment or forbearance status.”
The Department further advised that these borrowers be included
in a later CDR calculation once they are out of deferment or
forbearance and are subject to a risk of default (ED-OIG, 2003
p. 2).
2. Undertake intensive default aversion efforts in the first four
years of repayment.
Perhaps the most dramatic finding of this research is the be-
havior of the default curves for the FY1996 cohort. All school
types were found to peak in year two and stay high in years
three and four. According to several experts interviewed, many
student borrowers are not using the deferment and forbearance
options to the full extent allowed by statute because they don’t
know the process. Those students who leave postsecondary edu-
cation without completing their degree or certificate are most
likely to experience difficulty repaying their student loans. This
high-risk group needs special attention.
3. Collect data on graduation rates for outcome analysis.
The right data for assessing institutional performance is not
being collected. New data should track completion rates and
defaults using such variables as full-time and part-time stu-
dents, stop-outs, transfers, full-time employment, hours worked,
delayed enrollment, out-of-state, financial independence, depen-
dents other than spouse, single parents, ethnicity, and first-
generation status.
Recommendations
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4. Reorganize and re-bid the charters of the guaranty agencies.
The guaranty agencies need an enhanced mission. Guaranty
agencies are not needed to supervise debt collection; ED and its
debt collection agencies do that job very well. The guaranty agen-
cies know the student populations they serve and should be
involved exclusively in borrower education and default aversion.
5. Auction lender rights to make loans in order to attract better
loan terms and costs.
The federal cost of funds to lenders participating in the FFEL
program could be lowered by the government by introducing
competition in interest rate-setting. Eligible lenders with accept-
able default aversion statistics would participate in competitive
bidding for the right to provide funding on blocks of one to ten
billion dollars in loans, at a range of interest rates above yields
paid on U.S. Treasury Bonds. The government would select
qualified low-cost lenders.
6. Establish a national task force on demographics and default
aversion.
With cohort default rates at historic lows, now is a good time to
build on past accomplishments before default rates increase.
Good ideas need to be synthesized, and action plans proposed.
“It is time for a national task force of schools, lenders, guaranty
agencies and other stakeholders to develop new proposals and
consensus to follow up on the recommendations of the October
2000 Student Loan Repayment Conference” (Kesterman, 2003,
p. 48).
The overarching mission of the task force should be to
develop a student financial aid policy to assure that enough
loans and grants continue to flow from federal, state, and school
sources to prevent low- and middle-income students from being
squeezed out of the better higher educational opportunities. The
concomitant problem is how to assure repayment of the loans
when individual borrower debt burdens are increasing and con-
tributing to the overall risk level of the loan portfolio on a na-
tional level.
Further, the default question directly relates to how much
the federal government should subsidize higher education for
the American public. Solutions are needed to serve both na-
tional objectives and the needs of individuals to pursue higher
education without unmanageable debt burdens.
7. Establish a national panel on critical occupations in need of
special student loan debt forgiveness.
Loan forgiveness on the federal level began with the National
Defense Education Act of 1958 at a time when America was
catching up with the Russians in space. Low-interest loans and
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debt cancellations were provided to those entering the teaching
field and specializing in mathematics, engineering and science.
States have also experimented with debt forgiveness. Arkansas
offered medical scholarships as early as 1940. As of 2001-2002,
43 states either provided financial aid or repaid existing loans
in exchange for a work commitment also know as “workforce-
contingent financial aid” (Kirshstein, Berger, Benetar & Rhodes,
2004).
Many of these programs have experienced implementa-
tion problems associated with getting people to keep their com-
mitment to remain on the job. Some loan forgiveness programs
have contractual problems that need to be perfected, however
the idea is still worth pursuing. We need to determine what in-
centives are needed to assure that the critical human infrastruc-
tures of society are met—such as teachers, nurses, medical doc-
tors, police, firemen, and emergency-response workers—espe-
cially in minority communities. Debt forgiveness could become
a widespread social engineering tool to channel low- and middle-
income students into hard-to-fill skills and low-paying public
service jobs that are critical to society (e.g., teachers, nurses,
medical doctors, police, firemen, and emergency response work-
ers).
8. Federal loan limits should be increased and loan limits reviewed
annually.
Until the recent passage of the Deficit Reduction Act, which in-
creases annual loan limits effective July 1, 2007, annual limits
had remained the same for more than ten years despite sharp
increases in tuition and college costs. To fill the additional need
for credit students have turned to more expensive private loan
and credit card markets.  The private loan market share in-
creased from $5.6 billion in FY 2002-2003 to $10.6 billion in FY
2003-2004, or 9% of total financial aid (College Board, 2004).
Increases in aggregate loan limits should also be considered to
prevent students from losing eligibility before completing their
programs. The Deficit Reduction Act does not address aggre-
gate student borrowing limits.
9. Evaluate the use of Federal Pell Grants versus loans in terms
of impact on program completion.
A number of the scholar and experts interviewed expressed con-
cern about national priorities and the budget deficit curtailing
the disbursement of Federal Pell Grants to anyone who quali-
fies based on economic need. Both grants and loans reduce the
risk of non-completion. However, “congressional cost estimates
found the cost of grants to be roughly six times the cost of loans,
although the actual subsidy depends on future trends in inter-
est rates” (Kane, 1999, p. 16).
It may be possible to stretch the federal government’s
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with loans as a line of credit. Grants could still be part of the
financial aid program, subject to the student achieving certain
completion milestones. For example, students would open a line
of credit at the beginning of an academic year. After success-
fully completing that academic year, the student would receive
$4,050 in grant funds to reduce the loan balance. This approach
shifts Pell Grant risk from being a 100% taxpayer risk to a risk
shared by student borrowers and their schools. Such an ap-
proach provides an incentive for students to complete each year,
and at the same time, it leverages available Pell Grant budget
resources. A drawback to this proposal, however, is that stu-
dents who do not complete their education may find it difficult
to earn sufficient income to repay the line of credit.
10. Provide business tax credits to employers who hire students
and new graduates and repay part of their student loans.
Offering tax credits to students and parents for committing to
their own future is good social engineering and should be con-
tinued as permitted under the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 as
amended (Kane, 1999). Currently, tax savings to students and
families from the deduction on student loans amount to $6.3
billion (College Board, 2004). But many people are too poor to
save and therefore are unable to gain enough from tax credits to
make the decision to complete their education.
One interviewed expert suggested that leveraging busi-
ness tax credits might be the next step in expanding the finite
budget resources of states, schools, and the federal government
available for higher education. Providing tax incentives for em-
ployers so they can offer a pretax loan payment as a fringe ben-
efit was also a recommendation of the 2000 Student Loan Re-
payment Conference (Woods, 2001).
The federally guaranteed student loan program was created in
1965 as a convenience to middle-class families facing cash-flow
problems in meeting college costs. “From these simple begin-
nings arose a program that is now the centerpiece, not only of
student aid, but of the financing of the entire enterprise of higher
education itself” (Breneman, D., as cited in Fossey & Bateman,
1998). Student loan repayment has evolved into a national so-
cial issue resulting from the necessity of increased borrowing to
pay for higher education. Millions of Americans are now carry-
ing very large student loan debt burdens (Baum & O’Malley,
2003), which contribute to the overall risk level of the student
loan portfolio on a national level. This problem also contains an
associated risk of individual student borrowers becoming bank-
rupt or seriously burdened with debt that affects their quality of
life. Ultimately, the fundamental question directly relates to how
much the federal government is willing to subsidize higher edu-
cation for the American public and for the future of our coun-
try.
Summary
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APPENDIX
Likert-Scale Survey Results
Survey Statements Frequency Percent
Statement 1




Highly agree 57 37.3
Mean  =  4.01
SD = 1.088
Statement 2




























Highly agree 59 38.6
Mean = 3.99
SD = 1.016
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